

Proposal:

draft 3

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1.. Demand that the President or Congress propose to the Soviets--right now, during negotiations, or as the starting-point of new negotiations toward a comprehensive freeze and reductions--join us immediately in a mutual halt of key activities that can be adequately verified at this moment by national means of surveillance (without requiring the negotiation of any new means of verification): namely, warhead testing, flight-testing of ballistic missiles, and deployment of ballistic missiles. ASAT testing.

2. If the President is not willing to propose this, then Congress should enact the proposal by cutting all appropriations and new authorization for funds for such activities, making any expenditure contingent on Presidential certification, subject to Congressional review, that the Soviets have continued or reopened testing or deployment after the date of a US halt. ("No funds for testing warheads or ballistic missiles or deployment after a certain date unless the Soviets test or deploy.")

3.. Should this be defined as a stop of indefinite duration, or of limited duration--one or two years--a pause or moratorium? If limited, it might well include production explicitly, though this might still cause more controversy than it is worth. An argument for making it limited is that warhead testing can be much more reliably verified (down to very low yields) by some cooperative measures that have been largely agreed to in earlier negotiations, but that would still need some negotiating, even under a cooperative President (and Reagan has already indicated that he regarded these agreements as providing inadequate verification).

4.. A two year- half (or, one year with a possible one-year extension) would be: a vote of no confidence in Reagan's arms-and-arms-control policy; a recognition that the policy is not merely inadequate or mistaken but possibly disastrous, in its irreversible consequences and risks. (This could be said of Carter's policy, which was the same in its armaments aspects, but which might have been accompanied by a totally different arms control approach in his second term.)--these programs were less dangerously irreversible in 1978-80, under Carter, than as they enter production and deployment in 1983-84. (I.e., the weapons programs carried on under Carter are approaching irreversibility, and decisive Soviet counteractions, in the last two years to Reagan's administration: 1983-84. (MX testing and production and basing; P II testing and deployment; CM testing and deployment; ASAT testing.

5. Another reason for limited duration: Moratorium: ("temporary suspension of payments...delay of postponement...")

1. Postpone cruise missile deployment (and testing and production)--none of which is adequately verifiable, but in which US is at least two years ahead.

2. Get through Reagan years. Even if "he was elected...the only President we've got" was he elected to make the arms race irreversible and more dangerous? What are the responsibilities of Congress, and the public, if that is what he is doing?

Proposal: A Moratorium Day suspending business-as-usual in cities and campuses across the country on one working-day--Friday, October ~~xxx~~ 21, 1983 (the first of the four days now designated by the Freeze for demonstrations and other activities focuss

--how this differs from a Freeze:
--not negotiated;
--leaves out production: it would aim bringing a de facto halt to production, since no testing or deployment.
--leaves out cruise missiles, strategic bombers, dual-purpose bombers.
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But, if limited to one or two years, it could include suspension, as well, of deployment (and testing and production) of cruise missiles; and perhaps production as well, of ballistic missiles.

What of objection that this leaves SU with excess of SS-20's? There is no need to imply--as Freeze has done--that what limited concessions have been achieved in Geneva should be ignored; in any permanent halt or indefinitely prolonged halt, the Soviets could be required to reduce SS'20's down to what they have already proposed as acceptable for the purpose of keeping Pershings and cruise out of Europe, or somewhat lower. (162 missiles; or 162 warheads? The 75 missiles, which assumed 75 cruise launchers on our side, was just accepted as a basis for discussion this morning, f..3 August 1983.; to get rid of both P and Cruise, they should go lower: say, to 50 SS-20's, with no addition in the Far East, all others to be destroyed.

--Demos are not likely to be big

--P/CM over there, little prior attention = MX in European rallies

--Congress: can't do much (see Chappell); little public pressure,

Pres arms control negots, European govs (arms control ploy has worked with MX, better with P/CM; belief that having a few over there will help (Paul Simon, according to Paine)).

--Danger Freeze will be irrelevant; failure on MXX lobbying; demoralization as a result (calling into question the whole resolution approach, espt now in Senate; and strategy for seeking support in Congress--do we want people who will vote for both freeze and MX?

--Lack of a Freeze strategy for last two years of Reagan, and next Reagan term; what is interim goal; what is focus on congress?

--have we adjusted to freeze opposition: verification of production; what to include; hence, long negotiations

--need to give the troops an inspiring goal: in face of depressing events coming up: Senate vote; build-down; Central American Falklands; MX failure (even if House votes down!); P/CM deployment...

--use our energy not just to pass resolutions, but to end the arms race (and reverse it!): block movements to advance the race, and actions that make attainment of end and reversal more difficult; P/CM, MX, D-5; "Falklands" in Central America or Middle East.

--strategy ("bilateralism") that prevents us from having an effect on these latter "enabling" circumstances, defeats our purpose. However, if we shift to a Congressional funds approach, it's possible to educate Congress to enact "bilateral" conditional funding.

--We actually adopted this proposal, in two forms: a) June 1982, negotiations" pause, covering everything (including production: on argument--Paine--that surveillance of production from current facilities is adequate for a 1-2 year period, a moratorium during negotiations; only problems would arise over a longer period, after SU could have built up new production channels and facilities, secretly) (He believes this can be made qdeuately plausible to centrists).

(b) proposal for bilateral cut-off of warhead and flight-testing (Paine: to permit operational testing, need to define what is a "new" missile: SALT has done this for ICBMs, not for SLBMs (or IRBMs?))

--So maybe Freeze doesn't need a new vote on whether to endorse my proposal. (Though it includes deployment--at least of P).

--I'm suggesting that these proposals be made central, given attention, unlike past: They define a Quick Stop. (Everybody Stop NOW: best if French and British and Chinese are included, given SU attention on these; make their new programs bear responsibility for impairing chances of Stop.)

2.

Problems: misuse of Freeze energy in fall;
lack of strategy for next two years
need to block ongoing developments, immediately
(this would apply to new Presidency, too; programs
must halt before or at onset of his proposal of a
negotiated freeze).

Did strategy in 1979-80 take adequate account of:

- 1) Intransigence of Reagan?
- 2) Immediacy of programs threatening stability, accelerating race, make Freeze less attainable?
- 3) possibility of enough public support for Stop to make a Congressional approach feasible? (Hard to foresee, till June 1982--November 1982; but since then...)

-- need to "go beyond" June 12: can be done (perhaps, only) by nationwide Strike/Moratorium. Shift demos/vigils, visit to Oct.21

--Strike

---Armbands (Kim Agnew; fellow workers; bosses; discussion, commitment

--do bosses/schools give time off" ; commitment of institutions)

xxxx --nationwide count

----precedent of success 1969

---tie in churches? on Sunday: nationwide "sermon"?

--can be repeated--no limit to national size, as extent widens (Cambodia)
(all these require a larger focus than P/CM, at this point)

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(Intervention--nucs links occurs through: a) actual risks; 2) FU threats; (enabling intervention and escalation, then emerging out of these); 3) real purpose of strategic weapons (to ignore these links is to make it impossible to recognize or describe real purpose of these weapons; nor is alternative explanation very convincing, a political problem; in particular, alternatives downplay role of President, and risks of deliberate FU. 4) effect of "Falklands" on militarism; 5) effect of lobbyists for peripheral interests--in particular, Israel--on general pressures for arms race;.

The pressure to mention interventionism is usually seen merely as an attempt a) to "use" the energy; org/visibility/legitimacy/ crowds mobilized for one purpose (e.g., anti-nuc energy; or anti-nuc weapons) for another purpose; 2) evidence of the inertia and dogmatism of "radicals" who refuse to modify their agenda or perspective; 3) futile attempt to curry favor with, "show solidarity with" minorities at home and third world people or liberation movements abroad; 4) effort to "be radical" and (prematurely, and hopelessly) to attempt to "radicalize" the general population; 5) efforts to win recruits for radical orgs/

(Thus, see critiques of Freeze and Exterminism by: NLR; Chomsky; Beyond Survival; Darnovsky (more on other grounds); Klare (conventional weapons and intervention, vs. focus on nucs)
Compare these reproaches, and Freeze's suspicions, with 1) relation of nuclear energy movement to nuc weapons; 2) pacifists/CDers to bilateralists/tactical moderates.